



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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM

The Situation in Vietnam

ARMY review(s) completed.

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Information as of 1600
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HIGHLIGHTS

The sparring for the presidential candidacy between Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu is continuing and for the time being appears to be outside the realm of the military establishment itself.

I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Viet Cong military pressure against the Revolutionary Development continues to reflect a sharply increased rate (Paras. 1-3). Recent deserters and captured documents suggest that increased allied activities in Long An Province have been successful (Paras. 4-6).

II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu have still not come to terms over who will be the military candidate for the presidency (Paras. 1-3). The first round of the village and hamlet elections came off successfully (Para. 4).

III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Discussion of the latest MACV data on infiltration (Paras. 1-4).

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IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: Portions of a notebook recently captured in South Vietnam deal with DRV views of a protracted war and bloc aid (Paras. 1-3).

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. Viet Cong military pressure against the GVN's Revolutionary Development (RD) Program continues to reflect a sharply intensified pace.

2. A total of 105 of the 198 enemy attacks reported against RD worker teams thus far in 1967 have occurred during the period 1-26 March. Fifty-one of the attacks in March occurred in South Vietnam's northern I Corps area; 22 were recorded in IV Corps, and 16 each in II and III Corps. The March forays resulted in GVN casualties of 70 killed, 103 wounded, and 27 missing.

3. Numerous captured documents, [redacted] and prisoner/defector interrogations have underscored the importance to the Viet Cong of combating the RD program and other allied psywar activities. The Communists in many areas are complaining more and more frequently of lost popular support as a result of RD activities and of increasing desertions because of allied psywar. Measures urged to counter these losses range from increased propaganda among the population to stepped-up attacks on RD teams.

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Continued Allied Successes in Long An Province

4. Of 81 recent Viet Cong deserters in Long An Province, 50 were said to have been influenced by "allied propaganda," according to a Communist circular captured recently. The document, dated 18 January 1967, described allied psychological warfare activities as "intensive" and successful.

5. Pacification work in Long An, a heavily populated Mekong Delta province, has progressed considerably since November 1966 when a fresh battalion of the US 25th Infantry Division was deployed there in a pilot project. Record numbers of Chieu Hoi ralliers came over to the government side in February and March of this year and two villages formerly under Communist control have been reoccupied by allied forces.

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6. Allied psywar activities and the presence of US forces have had their main impact upon Viet Cong irregular forces. Very few of the Communist main force soldiers have rallied to the government, and the Communist political infrastructure in Long An is probably still intact.

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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. A number of senior generals, rather than the entire Congress of the Armed Forces, met informally on 31 March to discuss the presidential contest and determine the current thinking of Premier Ky and Chief of State Thieu toward becoming the military's candidate

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the generals agreed to postpone further deliberations and let the two contenders come to a personal agreement. Thieu, who joined the group toward the end of its meeting, reportedly told it that he had not decided yet whether to run. Ky allegedly passed the word that he would still defer to Thieu if necessary.

2. The sparring for the candidacy between Ky and Thieu appears for the time being to be a private one, outside the realm of the military establishment itself.

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3. Ky's propensity for publicity and Thieu's desire to stay out of the limelight and close to his family has given Ky an advantage in their undeclared race,

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Village Elections

4. The first round of the village and hamlet elections on 2 April came off successfully, with the

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threat of Viet Cong terrorism largely diminishing during the actual voting. This phase encompassed 219 villages in 33 provinces; the remaining participating villages will elect their councils during the next four Sundays. The voter turnout was 80.5 percent of the registered voters. A mass kidnaping of 12 candidates in Quang Nam Province was the most significant enemy activity. There was scattered terrorism involving grenades, small arms, and mortars.

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INFILTRATION TOTALS SINCE 1 OCT. 1965

Based on MACV holdings as of 28 February 1967

		CONFIRMED	ACCEPTED		POSSIBLE	MONTHLY TOTALS	
			PROBABLE	TOTAL			
1965	OCTOBER	6,500	—	6,500	200	6,700	
	NOVEMBER	3,500	200	3,700	600	4,300	
	DECEMBER	—	400	400	200	600	
1966	JANUARY	3,500	1,800	5,300	2,400	7,700	
	FEBRUARY	6,700	2,400	9,100	2,400	11,500	
	MARCH	11,500	1,300	12,800	3,900	16,700	
	APRIL	100	400	500	—	500	
	MAY	900	900	1,800	3,500	5,300	
	JUNE	10,500	600	11,100	1,300	12,400	
	JULY	4,200	100	4,300	5,500	9,800	
	AUGUST	1,600	400	2,000	3,000	5,000	
	SEPTEMBER	1,400	—	1,400	600	2,000	
	OCTOBER	100	500	600	4,600	5,200	
	NOVEMBER	—	100	100	600	700	
	DECEMBER	400	300	700	1,100	1,800	
	1967	JANUARY	—	400	400	1,200	1,600
		FEBRUARY	—	100	100	400	500
		MARCH	—	—	—	—	—
TOTALS		51,000	9,900	60,900	31,500	92,400	

MONTHLY AVERAGE (1 OCT. 1965 - 31 MARCH 1967)

ACCEPTED: CONFIRMED AND PROBABLE 3,400

TOTAL ACCEPTED AND POSSIBLE 5,100

ACCEPTED INFILTRATION: Those NVA personnel, groups, and units which have entered South Vietnam and are carried in the confirmed or probable categories.

CONFIRMED: A confirmed infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by a minimum of two POWs or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or two captured documents from the unit, or a combination of personnel and documents.

PROBABLE: A probable infiltration unit/group is one which is accepted in South Vietnam on the basis of information provided by one POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit/group, or a captured document, supported by information from other sources which can be evaluated as probably true.

POSSIBLE INFILTRATION: A possible infiltration unit/group is one which may be in South Vietnam on the basis of information which can be evaluated as possibly true even though no POW, returnee (Hoi Chanh), or document is available to verify the reports.

NOTE: In addition to the infiltrators which fall into the above infiltration categories, other units or groups have been mentioned in [] captured documents, interrogation reports and sightings by friendly forces, but the information is insufficient to warrant inclusion of these units or groups in any of the above categories.

MONTH OF INFILTRATION: The month established as the date an infiltration unit/group crosses the international border into South Vietnam for the first time.

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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM

1. The chart on the facing page sets forth statistics on North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam for the period 1 October 1965 through 31 March 1967. These data--supplied by MACV--are reported on a monthly basis. The beginning date of 1 October 1965 is used because it coincides with a period of substantial increase in infiltration and provides a sufficient data base on which to base an average figure. Significant reports of infiltration that MACV disseminates between its monthly statistical accountings will continue to be reported as they become available.

2. It is recognized that there are valid arguments for the use of other data frames in computing averages of monthly infiltration. For example, the average of the "accepted" category for 1966 would be approximately 4,100 per month while the average of the "accepted" and "possible" categories would be 6,550 per month. If other time frames are used, however, the information portrayed should be accompanied by specific references to the time frame used to preclude confusion.

3. The computation of an average monthly infiltration figure based on past historical data cannot be validly used to project trends in infiltration, or to determine whether there has been any change in the pattern of infiltration. In short, current infiltration figures do not forecast enemy intentions. The nature of the enemy's infiltration of personnel is such that it is difficult to detect many groups of personnel until after they have been in South Vietnam for as long as six months. In some instances, it has taken even longer. Therefore, the figures currently developed for the period from about 1 October 1966 through the end of March 1967 are considered to be incomplete.

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4. If average infiltration were computed for the period 1 October 1965 through 30 September 1966--the period for which infiltration data is considered to be relatively complete--the figures would be approximately 4,900 men per month for the "accepted" category and approximately 6,900 men per month for the "accepted" and "possible" categories.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. The notebook recently captured in South Vietnam referring to briefings by high-level party officials in early 1966 contained several candid descriptions of what the Vietnamese Communists mean by a "protracted war." All of the references speak of the duration time of a "protracted war" in terms much less sweeping than the Communists' propaganda pledges which claim they are prepared to fight for 20 years or longer if necessary. One reference expressed willingness to "stand against the enemy for two or three years, or even for eight years of protracted war." In another part of the notebook the speaker said "we must achieve victory within the next four years." In still another portion of the notebook the speaker referred to the Chinese position that the war must go on for a "few more years, and even worse, seven years."

2. The notebook also contained several candid comments on bloc aid and the Vietnamese attitude toward the Sino-Soviet dispute. One speaker acknowledged that Hanoi was "worried by the lack of unity" in the Communist world and claimed that "our success would have been greater" if the dispute had not existed. He admitted, however, that the aid received had been important and that the Vietnamese would not have been able to "achieve what we did" without it.

3. The speaker's references to the amount of bloc aid are difficult to evaluate. He said, for example, that assistance to North Vietnam during 1965 was equal to "the quantity of equipment provided for the building of the North during the previous five years." Although most of the pre-1965 Communist aid to the DRV was economic in nature, it is likely that he was talking about both military and economic aid delivered in 1965--an estimated US \$410 million.

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On foreign assistance to the South, the speaker said the bloc was supplying three fourths of the weapons sent to the South and half of the Viet Cong budget. He referred to this aid for the South as supplied "mainly by China" and added that the quantity of weapons was so large that "we couldn't transport all of them."

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